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DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS-A NEED
FOR REVISION
GEORGE TORBICA AND IVAN FUGATE*

Since the field of deficiency judgments is so closely allied with
the broader field of chattel mortgages, any consideration of the
problems arising under the former must be linked to the two lines
of judicial authority concerning the effect of a chattel mortgage
upon the title of the mortgaged properties. The real problems
arising under deficiency judgments all seem to hinge upon the
determination of which party holds legal title to the property.
In Colorado, and some other states, the mortgage is seemingly
considered to be a conditional sale which allows the title to remain
in the mortgagee.' Other jurisdictions view the mortgage as only
a lien, with the title passing to the mortgagor until his default and
foreclosure. In Colorado, the fact that title is considered to rest
exclusively in the mortgagee enables him to repossess under the
terms of the ortgag e a
offe. the
tgaged securit..y f r
without recourse to the courts. This "bypassing" of our courts
presents the problem of whether or not the price received by the
mortgagee at the sale of the mortgaged security was a fair and
equitable one, for, in Colorado, the mortgagee is entitled to credit
the proceeds of the sale to the balance owed him by the mortgagor
and then sue for the deficiency. 2 Unless the mortgagor can show
retaken
bad faith in the conduct of the sale, the sale price of the
3
property will stand as the credit to which he is entitled.
Under the "equitable" rule, which prevails in other jurisdictions, the title to the property is in the mortgagor, and the only
way in which the mortgagee can repossess and sell the security
is to go into court and ask for a foreclosure of his lien. This brings
the sale within the purview of the court and affords an opportunity for setting standards both as to the conduct of the sale and the
determination of the fair value of the mortgaged security. It enables the court, for instance, to determine before sale what constitutes a fair price for the property. In Colorado, there can be
no such standards since the court is seldom aware of the sale until
it has already taken place. Due to the difficulty of obtaining accurate information as to reasonable price of a chattel when repossessed, the court must content itself with stating that mere
inadequacy of the price obtained will not invalidate the sale.
Neither do the courts seem particularly concerned when it can be
shown that the chattel brought only a fraction of its true market
value. It is true that in the case of automobiles the court may require that the mortgagor be given credit for the NADA 4 "blue
* Students, University of Denver College of Law.

Chattel Mortgages In Colorado 1 (1935).
Id, at 37.
'Ramstetter v. McGinnis, 100 Colo. 494, 68 P. 2d 454 (1937).
4 National Automobile Dealers Association.
'HELLERSTEIN,
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book" value. However, those familiar with the NADA handbook
know that it seldom correctly reflects the actual market value in
any given locality.
There also seems to be little objection in this state to the sale
of the mortgaged security to wholesale dealers in the property.
Some jurisdictions, adopting a more realistic view of such practices, held otherwise. 5 It would seem that even in Colorado this
might be attacked on the ground that the mortgagee is obliged to
obtain the most reasonable value under the circumstances and must
of the highest possible
do nothing to interfere with the obtaining
bid for the benefit of the mortgagor.6
Probably the most harsh aspect of the chattel mortgage statute
as it applies to deficiency judgments is the practice of allowing the
"insecure" mortgagee to repossess the security almost at will. The
rule in Colorado seems to be that the mortgagee has the right to
determine for himself whether he is unsafe in his security, subject
must be exercised
to the rather vague limitation that his judgment
in "good faith and upon reasonable grounds."' 7 The injustices of
this rule are readily seen when it is pointed out that under the socalled "insecurity clause"' 8 the seller-mortgagee might well exact
a large down payment as well as a mortgage note from the mortgagor and then, within twenty-four hours, repossess and sell the
security. Again, the mortgagor would be compelled to accept the
amount obtained from the sale-of the security as a credit against
the total of the note and might conceivably have to pay a deficiency
judgment even though he had had the use of the property for only
one day! In short, the mortgagor is completely at the mercy of
the mortgagee. And all because of our insistence upon following
an antiquated interpretation of the effect of a chattel mortgage!
APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE RULE

While it is to be admitted that the problem of preventing
people from buying what they cannot afford defies present solution,
many strides have been made in other states in an effort to reduce
the adverse effects of repossession, re-sale, and deficiency awards
on persons of reduced means. These jurisdictions follow the
"equitable" view that the mortgage is only a lien; title remaining
in the mortgagor until foreclosure. It might seem at first blush
that we have strayed far afield from the specific subject of deficiency judgments; however, extensive research seems to indicate
that the source of most injustices perpetrated upon the debtormortgagor is in the interpretation in various jurisdictions of the
effect a mortgage has on ownership of the mortgaged security. For
in those states where it is considered that the mortgagee has legal
title to the property, there seem to be fewer legal obstacles to the
mortagee's retaking his own property, and selling it at his own
pleasure.
5 Universal credit Co. v. Uhri, 101 S. W. 2d 501 (Mo. App., 1937).

a Colorado Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Navins, 82 Colo. 130, 257 P. 357 (1927).
T Thomas v. Beirne, 94 Colo. 429, 30 P. 2d 863 (1934).
S HELLERSTEIN, 0P. Cit., supra, at 39.
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States following the so-called "equitable" rule recognize
merely a lien by the mortgagee in the security and logically require that the repossession and sale be conducted under the watchful eye of both the court and the defaulting mortgagor. Louisiana,
which follows the latter rule, provides, in all foreclosure actions,
for the appointment of three appraisers. One of the appraisers is
selected by the mortgagor, and the other two are chosen by the
district judge having jurisdiction over the property. They are
required to make a personal examination of the property that is
appraised and by formal, authentic act, before a notary or clerk
of court, an inventory is prepared setting forth the reasonable
value of such chattels. In all cases, the appraisers appointed are
disinterested parties and at least fairly familiar with the property
they are called upon to appraise. 9 The Attorney General of Louisiana, in passing on the situation which arises when the mortgagee
waives appraisement and proceeds with the sale, has stated the
rule to be that, where a mortgagee or other creditor takes advantage
of a waiver of the right of appraisement, the sale discharges the
debt and the creditor thereafter has no right to proceed against
th dphtor nr hig ot.her pronprtv fnr nnv rpmaining doionou lO
In the case of Home Finance Service v. Walmsley,1' the Louisiana
Appellate Court stated that a creditor who had disposed of the
debtor's pledged automobile without appraisement and credited the
proceeds on the debtor's note could not thereafter maintain suit for
recovery of the remaining deficiency. The rule in Louisiana permits the security to be valued at close to "market value" and does
not indulge in vague references to "reasonable value under the
circumstances," a phrase finding common usage in our Colorado
courts.
IOWA RULE
Although the rule which obtains in the Iowa courts does not
provide as much protection to the debtor, it still seems infinitely
superior to the rule in Colorado. Thus, under the Iowa Code,
which adheres to the theory that only a lien is created in the mortgagee, it is held that personal property which is levied upon and
advertised for sale on execution must be appraised before sale by
two disinterested members of the community, one of whom shall
be chosen by the execution debtor and the other by the creditor.
If no agreement can be reached in the selection, the levying officer
may select the appraisers. The appraisers shall then return a just
appraisement if they can agree; if they cannot agree, they shall
choose another disinterested citizen and with his assistance shall
complete the appraisal. When offered for sale, the property shall
not be sold upon the first offer for less than two-thirds of said valu'La. Acts 1934, No. 28.
10Opinions of Attorney General 1934-1936, p. 633.
11 176 So. 415 (La. App., 1937).
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ation. If offered for three successive days at the same place and
hour of day as advertised and no bid is received equal to two-thirds
of the appraised value thereof, it can be sold for one half of said
valuation. Only when the above conditions have been met and a
deficiency still exists after the sale of the property may the judgment holder order out another execution for the balance remaining.
True, it may be argued that the provision for the sale of the
mortgaged chattel at anywhere from one-half to two-thirds of its
appraised value actually allows the buyer an opportunity to purchase the article for two-thirds and no more. However, the sale is
still conducted under the careful scrutiny of the court and providing the sale is not one to which only dealers in the commodity
familiar with the two-thirds provision are invited, the mortgagor
still has a fighting chance to obtain a bid from a private individual
for full market value. Thus, although "market value" for the
mortgaged security is not a certainty, at least the sale is conducted
on a fair and reasonable basis and under the supervision of the
court. It will also be noted that provision is made for advertising
the date and nlace of sale, a provision omitted from the Colorado
rule. The entire procedure eliminates the possibility of collusion
between mortgagee and purchaser which exists in Colorado. and
the mortgagor is at least assured that he will not be subjected to
an unreasonable deficiency judgment merely because of a grossly
inadequate sale price.
NEED FOR REVISION IN COLORADO

After having viewed the procedure followed in Louisiana and
Iowa, two of many states with similar rules, it should be apparent
that our Colorado rule is sadly in need of revision. Certainly it
cannot be denied that a real problem exists in the instance of the
man of moderate means who purchases an automobile, makes a
down payment of several hundred dollars, signs a note with an
exorbitant interest rate, then defaults after one or two payments,
has his chattel repossessed and sold for a sum considerably less than
the original purchase price. He then finds himself legally obligated
to pay a deficiency judgment that in effect charges him an utterly
fantastic sum for the use of the car for only a short time. The
Denver Legal Aid Society is constantly confronted with similar
problems, most of which with the same unfortunate results. The injustice does not end there. Too often, it happens that the person
who purchases the mortgaged security at the sale is the original
seller who. after purchasing the automobile at a ridiculously low
figure, manages somewhat miraculously to sell it again at a substantial profit. Thousands of dollars are often made from the sale
of one automobile through this same procedure.
It must be noted that the primary stumbling block in Colorado
to an effective handling of deficiency judgments is our adherence
to the outmoded legal fiction that in cases of sale with a chattel
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mortgage note, the title remains in the mortgagee. As long as we
continue to operate under this rule, the means of regulating the
repossession and sale of a mortgaged chattel will not be adequate
to effect any great reduction in the number of debtors who are
forced into a lifetime of debt and economic hardship because of
a deflated sale price of the mortgaged chattel and the consequent
grossly exaggerated deficiency remaining. However, because of the
tremendous political power of those interested in retaining our
present system, it is doubtful that any legislative remedy can be
obtained at this time. It may well be that the answer lies in making
the courts aware of all the facts in these problems which have only
infrequently been brought before them. If our courts could be convinced that the man who purchases an automobile or refrigerator,
defaults after a few payments and returns the article in substantially the same condition he originally purchased it, should be allowed a credit for the original sale price minus reasonable depreciation, the deficiency judgment then allowed would be no more than
the debtor deserves for his default, and our problem would be on
its way to solution.

BEYOND INSTITUTES, WHAT?-A PROGRAM
FOR TOPICAL LUNCHEONS
ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT
of the Denver Bar

Together with many other lawyers, I have learned a great
deal from the institutes which have been conducted by the Colorado and Denver Bar Associations. Such institutes probably offer
the best means of imparting general information quickly and
efficiently. I have been conscious, however, both as a spectator
and as a participant in panel discussions, that many of the listeners leave the institutes with unanswered questions. Often these
questions relate not merely to isolated or unique transactions, but
rather they involve problems which recur over and over again.
The experience of other lawyers in dealing with these particular
problems would be most helpful if that experience could be shared.
I have a most profound respect for the aggregate knowledge
residing in a group of lawyers on any problem that can be conceived. It is unfortunate that there has been almost no svstematic
way in which such joint knowledge could be shared. Time and
time again lawyers who specialize in particular fields, and who are
participating in institutes, find that there are members of the
audience who know much more about a particular topic than the
so-called expert. In the conduct of an institute, that specialized
knowledge in the audience ordinarily cannot be made available to
the group. In order to cover the ground, an institute cannot make

